We study a fundamental conflict in economic decision-making, the trade-off between equality, equity and incentives, in a new experimental game that nests a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. In a 2x2 design, we let subjects either vote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal endowments are either task-determined or random. We find that earned endowments lead to less support for redistribution and less cooperation. Subjects' voting is influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, in addition to self-interest. Cooperation rates respond rather continuously to incentives. JEL-Codes: C91, C92, D31, D63, H41
Introduction
Societies and organizations typically face a conflict between attending to the needs of their weaker members, the necessity of providing incentives for generating output, and concerns that reward for effort and contribution of resources be fairly assigned. At the macro level, the tradeoffs in question are navigated, for instance, by determining levels of provision of social benefits and the extent and progressivity of taxation (Benabou, 2000) . At the micro level, they play out in the negotiation of responsibilities and sharing of consumption in households (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996) , and in the determination of how differentiated rewards are in organizations (Lazear, 1989; Irlenbusch and Ruchala, 2008) .
We study democratic institutional choice concerning the trade-off between equality, equity and incentives in a stylized experimental environment that reflects the main elements of the problem relevant to both firm and society (see also Tyran and Sausgruber, 2006; Höchtl et al., 2012) . Compared to previous literature (discussed below), our experiment is characterized by the following features. The cost of redistribution depends on the future behavioral responses of subjects and is therefore uncertain, rather than exogenously determined (or absent altogether).
Furthermore, we can study whether groups adopt institutions that promote efficiency and whether choosing an institution democratically affects the subsequent reaction to the institution's incentives.
Our paper proposes a new experimental setup that captures this trade-off in a general and transparent way by nesting the standard linear voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) or public goods game in a more universal but straightforward incentive framework. More specifically, in our experiment a subject is paired with two others and makes a series of fifteen decisions on how much of an endowment of tokens to contribute to a group project and how much to retain as private income. Contributions to the group project are scaled up, mimicking a team production opportunity with a productivity advantage over a private one. The innovation in our setup which makes it possible to study the trade-offs mentioned above is the combination of two features. First, the three group members have unequal endowments. While there are several examples of public goods games in the literature that implement unequal endowments (e.g., Chan et al., 1999; van Dijk et al., 2002; Cherry et al., 2005; Buckley and Croson, 2006; Sadrieh and Verbon, 2006; Reuben and Riedl, 2009) , none of them studies the trade-off between incentives and equality. Second, because we nest the standard voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes, the money generated by the team can be divided up (i) equally, (ii) in proportion to amounts contributed, or (iii) by any linear combination of the equal and the proportional distribution rules. With equal distribution, we have a division scheme that provides no incentive for a maximizer of private earnings to contribute but that would render earnings fully equal. With division of team output by contributions, in contrast, there is a straightforward incentive for each to contribute her entire endowment, but earnings are highly unequal.
Our study uses four conditions in a 2x2 factorial design. In two treatments, we allow subjects to determine the setting of the division parameter (which is crucial for the degree of redistribution) by majority vote, while in two others the parameter is set exogenously, allowing us to examine the response of contributions to changes in incentives free of strategic motivation to influence voting. The other dimension of variation that we study concerns the origin of the inequality of endowments. We implement two treatments in which unequal endowments are assigned randomly and two in which the endowments are earned by performance on a quiz that may create feelings of entitlement over the endowment (Gächter and Riedl, 2005) . This allows us to investigate whether voting and responses to incentives are influenced by differing perspectives regarding the fairness of the inequalities within the group.
We find that earned endowments (through the quiz) lead to less support for redistribution and to slightly less cooperation. Despite the self-interest manifested in subjects' voting, we find evidence of concerns over both equality and fairness. With respect to equality, both high and middle endowment subjects partially vote for redistribution, contrary to their material interests.
Subjects obtaining more cooperative scores in a Ring-test (see Offerman et al., 1996) contribute more unconditionally and are less responsive to incentive changes, as are female subjects. With respect to fairness, we find evidence that subjects display greater preference for equality when inequalities are arbitrary than when they are earned by task performance. This finding highlights the interaction between equality and fairness concerns when the two cut in opposite directions.
Finally, we find mild indications that subjects act more cooperatively under voted than under identical but exogenous distribution settings; however, the difference is not significant according to group-level non-parametric tests. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of related literature. Section 3 describes our experimental design and the theoretical predictions. Results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
A brief account of related literature
Tensions between equality, fair allocation of rewards, and incentives for providing work effort are ubiquitous and have been studied from various perspectives. Concerns for fairness sometimes overlap but at other times pull against desires for equality or concern for the least well off. Experimental economists including Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) and Burrows and Loomes (1994) find that subjects place less weight on equality per se when unequal incomes are perceived to have been earned. Fong (2001) , Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Alesina and Giuliano (2010) , for instance, provide evidence that support for redistribution depends on perceptions of fairness.
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In their laboratory experiment on redistributive taxation, Durante, Putterman and van der Weele (2012) find that subjects desire significantly less redistribution when differences are earned by performance on a quiz or game of skill. 2 Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) combine a public goods game with an ex-post redistribution scheme and show that such a combination can increase cooperation and efficiency. 3 In a somewhat different setup, Großer and Reuben (2009) investigate voting on redistribution of profits earned in a competitive market. They observe voting decisions that lead to more equal distributions than implemented by the market outcome. Cabrales et al. (2012) study equilibrium selection in a game where group members have to make costly effort decisions (with random production as outcome) and can then vote on redistributing the whole output equally.
The literature on incentives in organizations includes among its themes the idea that there must be at least potential inequality of earnings (members of a team cannot simply divide their net product by fixed shares) if efficient effort levels are to be elicited (Holmström, 1982) .
1 A recent study by Rey-Biel et al. (2011) compares sharing norms in the US and in Spain, showing that Spanish subjects ascribe poverty of others to bad luck -inducing them to give more to the poor -while Americans associate poverty with a lack of effort -triggering lower amounts of giving to the poor. There is also an experimental literature on competing fairness ideals; see, for example, Cappelen et al. (2010) .
2 In general, there is a large literature on the effects of earned versus windfall endowments on subsequent decisions that potentially involve other-regarding preferences (see Reinstein and Riener, 2012 , for a recent contribution). For reasons of succinctness we do not provide an overview here. 3 We do not survey the extensive literature on social motives here. A general model and ample experimental evidence, taking equity and efficiency preferences into account in a unified framework, is provided by Charness and Rabin (2002) . We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that our setting is more realistic than most of the existing work that imposes an exogenous and known cost of redistribution. In contrast, our setup entails an endogenous cost of redistribution, depending on the future behavior of group members, which is uncertain a priori.
However, inducing maximum competition among team members might mean forgoing important benefits from helping behaviors and mutual monitoring, so that basing some pay on group rather than individual performance may be a more efficient approach (Itoh, 1992) . In his seminal paper on gift exchange in the employment relationship, Akerlof (1982) hypothesized that an employer might avoid differentiating pay among similar workers as a form of generosity that more capable workers would reward with greater effort due to emotional attachments among the workers.
The mixing of equal pay and pay-for-effort incorporated in our experiment was first used in a model of cooperatives by Sen (1966) . Sen showed that with diminishing returns and thus a decreasing marginal product of labor, payment strictly proportional to contribution would induce socially excessive effort. Hence, introducing a degree of equalization served as an optimal corrective. Sen's analysis also showed that complete equality of distribution would generate a low effort equilibrium unless the team members' preferences towards one another were highly altruistic.
The undermining of incentives in a team by egalitarian output sharing à la Holmström (1982) has been studied in the laboratory in the form of the VCM (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Ledyard, 1995; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010) with its well-known tension between individual (own money-maximizing) and collective (welfare maximizing) rationality. In what follows, we re-conceptualize the VCM as the egalitarian end of an array of incentive schemes in which the private return from allocations to the group project -i.e., the marginal per capita return (MPCR)
-grows from MPCR < 1 (the VCM with its free-riding incentives) to MPCR > 1 (an individually profitable opportunity). 4 While the advantage of setting the MPCR > 1 would be unambiguous if members faced the group production opportunity from the same starting points, our subjects face an equality vs. incentives trade-off due to sharply differing endowments. In our endogenous parameter treatments, they accordingly experience or evade free-riding incentives as a function of voting choices potentially influenced by self-interest, egalitarian sentiments, and conceptions of fairness. 4 Experiments studying responsiveness to ratios of return to private versus public allocations extending into the range in which contributing is privately optimal include Prisbrey (1996, 1997) and Brandts and Schram (2001) .
The nesting of the VCM in a spectrum of mixed incentive schemes as in Sen (1966) is found in the experimental literature, to our knowledge, only in Grosse et al. (2011) . In their set-up, however, endowments are equal, and VCM incentives represent a lack of monitoring, not a preference for egalitarian distribution.
Finally, our research is related to a rapidly growing number of experiments on choosing institutions democratically and the consequences of such an option on cooperative behavior (see Walker et al., 2000; Margreiter et al., 2005; Tyran and Feld, 2006; Kosfeld et al., 2008; Dal Bó et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2010; Kamei et al., 2011; Putterman et al., 2011; Markussen et al., 2012) .
Many of these studies suggest that the choice of an institution itself has a positive effect on cooperative behavior and compliance with the democratically implemented norm.
Experimental Design and Predictions

Basic setup
We run a total of eight experimental sessions with 18 subjects each, randomly assigning two sessions to each of four treatments (see Table 1 ). In each session, subjects are randomly assigned to fixed groups of 3 who remain anonymous to one another. In each group, one subject has an endowment of 5 tokens, a second an endowment of 10 tokens, and a third an endowment of 15 tokens, with a given subject receiving the same endowment in each of 15 periods of play. In each period, subjects must decide how many tokens to put in a group project, with the remainder being placed in a private account. In a given period, subject i earns
where E i is i's endowment (5, 10 or 15), C i is her contribution to the group project (an integer),
is the sum of the three contributions in a given period, j = l, m, h represents the low, middle, and high endowment subjects respectively, 1 < R < 3 is the scaling factor, and α is the share of group output distributed on the basis of contributions, with share (1 -α) distributed equally. In the experiment,
, and we set R = 2, so equation (1) becomes
This choice of parameters means that the marginal return from contributing to the group project,
, is less than 1 when α < 0.25 and greater than 1 when α > 0.25. If all subjects are strictly self-interested, perfectly rational, and have common knowledge of this, then contributions should be zero and earnings 5, 10 and 15, respectively, when α = 0, 0.1 or 0.2. Under the same assumptions, contributions should be equal to endowments when α ≥ 0.3, with earnings out of the fixed total of 60 varying from a relatively equal 17, 20, and 23 when α = 0.3 to their most unequal values of 10, 20 and 30 when α = 1. This wide scope for equalization without in theory undermining incentives creates a broad space for expression of distributive preferences, distributional conflict, and "posturing" so as to influence voting outcomes.
Insert Table 1 around here
In the Quiz-Vote (QV) and Quiz-Exogenous (QE) treatments, subjects first complete a general knowledge quiz consisting of 20 questions before being assigned to the low, middle or high endowment level based on their performance. In the Random-Vote (RV) and the RandomExogenous (RE) treatments, there is no quiz, and the endowment levels are assigned randomly.
In the QV and RV treatments, subjects specify the value of α that they favor at the beginning of each period and are then shown the value selected by the group-the median value among the three submitted (without revealing the other two votes)-before proceeding to make their contribution decisions. To facilitate testing of whether exogeneity of α influences contribution decisions, we match each RV (QV) treatment group to an RE (QE) group and assign the latter the precise sequence of α's selected by voting in the former. RE (QE) subjects were simply told that the relevant α-value for a specific period would be announced at its beginning and that it would always come from the set   When considering how to vote in the QV and RV treatments, such subjects should likewise assume that C i = 0 for all i when α < 0.25 and C i = E i for all i for α > 0.25. Given this, if it were assumed that subjects simply voted their interest without consideration of how others might vote, low endowment subjects would vote for α = 0.3, which maximizes their earnings at 17, high endowment subjects would vote for α = 1, which maximizes their earnings at 30, and middle endowment subjects would be indifferent between the eight values of α from 0.3 to 1, since they earn 20, regardless. Assuming that the middle endowment subjects choose randomly among these values, α would thus vary randomly over the 0.3-to-1 range, and expected incomes would be midway between the most and least equal sets reported above, i.e. 13.5, 20 and 26.5. When taking others' expected votes into account, both high and low endowment subjects can reason that the middle endowment subject's voted α -call it α m -will be decisive. A high endowment subject has no reason to favor one value over another in the interval α m ≤ α ≤ 1, but with no way to anticipate what α m will be in a given period, a high endowment voter should always choose the weakly dominant strategy of voting for α = 1. 6 The position of the low endowment subject, who would likewise be indifferent among values of α in the interval 0.3 ≤ α ≤ α m , is slightly different.
While for this subject the same arguments as above lead to a prediction of voting for α = 0.3, it is also true that she can safely vote for α = 0, 0. 
Self-interested voting with behavioral responsiveness to marginal incentives
A frequent finding in public goods experiments that will be echoed in our own results is that subjects respond to increasing marginal incentives even when strict rationality suggests that Although it is obvious, note that standard preferences would not predict any treatment differences between our four conditions. Hence, it seems relevant to look at alternative predictions based on (heterogeneous) social preferences.
Heterogeneous social preferences and the influence of voting
We first consider two forms of social preferences that may cause subjects' behaviors to deviate from what would maximize their own pay-offs. These are (a) inequality aversion, and (b) concerns with equity, or respect for "earned" inequalities. The presence and weight placed on each preference may vary among individuals and when present may affect both contribution and voting choices.
With regard to (a), suppose that each subject's utility takes the form modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In their model of inequity aversion, individuals get utility from their own income, but they may get disutility from earning less than others (disadvantageous inequality) or more than others (advantageous inequality). For our high endowment subjects, only advantageous inequality is of potential concern, for low ones only disadvantageous inequality, and for middle ones both types of inequalities. Returning to the non-behavioral response assumption of Section 3.2.1 and supposing that subjects vote on our parameter α assuming that inequality aversion has (2001) . The latter along with Saijo and Nakamura (1995) find that some subjects fail to contribute their full endowments when that is the privately optimal course. Although the Palfrey-Prisbrey papers suggest fairly smooth changes in average contributions around MPCR = 1 while Brandts and Schram fit a one-step function to their data that displays a step between the MPCR values surrounding that threshold, none of their papers report tests of whether contributions continue to vary significantly with changes in MPCR once it surpasses 1. no first-order effect on contributions, inequality aversion would not alter the vote of a low endowment subject, who in the absence of social preferences already votes for α ≤ 0.3. But both middle and high endowment subjects would vote for lower values of α than otherwise if they are sufficiently inequality averse. Since no income sacrifice is required of her under the assumption of fully rational responses to α, a middle endowment subject with any degree of inequality aversion would vote for α = 0.3, minimizing both advantageous and disadvantageous inequality in a single stroke, while keeping incentives to contribute (due to α > 0.25).
However, a middle endowment subject recognizing behavioral responses to marginal incentive changes and a high endowment subject under either the standard or behavioral assumption about how C i responds to α, will in contrast anticipate a loss of own income as a cost of reducing inequalities. Assuming similar distributions of inequality aversion in high and middle endowment subjects, we should expect more downward bias in votes for α among the latter due to the double-edged effect of inequality aversion on the parts of middle versus the one-sided effect for high endowment subjects. Obviously, there may be additional considerations in the repeated game. With social preferences, almost any decision might be rationalizable in the repeated game. We thus refrain from discussing repeated game issues here and will control for possible effects where appropriate in our empirical analysis.
Factor (b), the desire of some subjects that "earned" inequalities not be unfairly eliminated, can be present -in our QV treatment -in the same individuals who are inequality averse, or by itself. If present alone, this equity concern will have no influence on the votes of high endowment subjects and of middle endowment subjects who assume behavioral responsiveness of contributions, since they select α = 1 in any case. If strong enough, however, it may cause middle endowment subjects who assume fully rational contribution choices to bias their votes upwards within the 0.3 ≤ α ≤ 1 range, and may lead some low endowment subjects to vote, contrary to their own interest, for α > 0.3. For subjects having both equality and equity preferences, the prediction is one of favoring higher values of α in the QV than in the RV treatment.
Assuming substantial numbers of subjects who are averse to inequalities, averse to equalizing earned inequalities, or both, we make the following social behavior predictions:
Hs.1. Middle and low endowment subjects will on average vote for lower α in the RV than in the QV treatment. Some high endowment subjects will vote for α < 1, and more high endowment subjects will do so in the RV than in the QV treatment.
Finally, based on previous empirical results (e.g., Dal Bó et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2010) we anticipate a possible treatment effect of the voting condition. In particular, insofar as contributions are not already at their maximum due to behavioral responsiveness or other factors, democratic choice may lead group members to respond to the chosen α with higher contributions if they are intrinsically motivated to be more cooperative under decisions of their own making.
With these factors in mind, we hypothesize that at a given level of α, contributions will be higher in the voting treatments than in the exogenous treatments.
Laboratory protocol
The computerized experiment (using z-Tree; Fischbacher, 2007) was run with undergraduate students from various disciplines (recruited via ORSEE; Greiner, 2004) at the University of Innsbruck. In total, 144 students (36 in each treatment) participated in eight sessions.
Sessions proceeded in the following way: Upon entering the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to cubicles and provided with written instructions (see Appendix C) for the first part of the experiment, i.e. the Ring-test.
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The instructions were read out aloud by the experimenter. Subjects knew that there would be a second part of the experiment and that it would be unrelated to the first part. Upon completion of the first part, the instructions for the second part were handed out and read aloud. Participants were then asked to answer a set of 9 In this fully incentivized test, subjects have to make binary choices in 24 different allocation tasks (see Appendix D). In each task, a subject has to choose among two alternative ways of allocating money to herself and a recipient.
Adding up the 24 decisions yields a total sum of money allocated to oneself (x-amount) and to the recipient (yamount). From the ratio (x/y) one can calculate a subject's social orientation, indicated by a vector , which can then be classified into any of eight categories: individualism, altruism, cooperation, competition, martyrdom, masochism, sadomasochism, and aggression. See Offerman et al. (1996) or Brosig (2002) for further details.
twelve control questions to make sure that the rules of the game had been fully understood. Any incorrect entries were corrected and all remaining questions were clarified before the second part commenced. In the treatments with the quiz, subjects began this part with the trivia questions that determined the endowment of a subject throughout the second part of the experiment. Treatments without the quiz started with the random assignment of endowments. When taking the quiz subjects knew the details of the game to commence after the quiz, and they knew that they were already randomly assigned to a three-person group and that the member with the most correct answers would become the high endowment subject, the member with the second-most correct answers the middle endowment subject, and the member with the fewest correct answers the low endowment subject.
At the end of each period, subjects were informed about all individual contributions and incomes within their group, identified by a unique ID. After 15 periods, the experiment ended, subjects filled out a brief questionnaire (from which we extract the gender information used later), and subjects were paid out privately and in cash. Sessions lasted in total for a bit less than two hours. Average earnings were € 33.47 per subject, which breaks down into € 5.59 for part 1
(the Ring-test) and € 27.88 for part 2 (the main experiment). Table 2 provides an overview of some key outcomes by treatment. Beginning with the votes that subjects cast for the distribution parameter α, we note that the mean voted α is significantly higher in QV than in RV (0.669 vs. 0.625; p = 0.05, Mann-Whitney U test).
Results
Descriptive overview of results
Voting
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This indicates that earned endowments lead to a significantly lower willingness to redistribute money. Panel 1 in Figure 1 plots the mean voted α by period and separated by treatment, revealing little change in voting choices over time.
Looking at subjects with different endowment levels, we see that as predicted the preferred α tended to be lower for low than for high endowment subjects, with the average value voted for by middle endowment subjects lying in between. This tendency to vote differently depending on endowment is confirmed by pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests among the three endowment 10 The test is based on group averages, i.e., treating each group as one independent observation. levels in each group (all with p < 0.01), where the unit of observation is the mean vote of a subject over time. The averages in Table 2 and the corresponding Figure 2 show, in line with our prediction in Hn.2, strong differences between low, middle and high endowment subjects. Low endowment subjects clearly did not always vote for α of 0.3, with α of 0 being in fact their modal choice. Their average vote for α is a little less than 0.4 in QV, and a little less than 0.2 in RV, a statistically significant difference (p < 0.01; Mann Whitney U-test). In general, low endowment subjects on average cast their vote as if they view inequality that disfavors them as being more acceptable when it is the result of performance (in QV) than pure luck (in RV).
Insert Table 2 For middle endowment subjects, α = 1 is also the modal choice, accounting for 43% (59%) of votes in QV (RV). This frequency of middle subjects' votes for α = 1 is at odds with prediction Hn.2 that they would randomize votes over the 0.3 to 1.0 range and consistent rather with Hb.1, which assumes that middle subjects take into account the behavioral sensitivity of contributions to α throughout its range. The middle subject turned out to be the median voter in two-thirds (three quarters) of all votes in QV (RV), largely but not entirely in line with hypothesis Hn.2.
Contributions
In Table 2 and in much of our discussion we do not report absolute contribution C i but proportions of endowment contributed, C i /E i , which aids comparability across endowment levels.
On average, subjects contributed to their group project the large majority of their tokens, ranging from 82.8% of their endowments in the QE treatment to 88.4% in the RE treatment (see Figure   1 , Panel 2 for a breakdown by period and treatment). Contributions were on average higher when endowments were random (as opposed to earned) and when α was determined by voting rather than exogenously. However, neither of these differences is statistically significant in nonparametric tests based on group averages.
The observed contribution averages are not far from what would be expected had behaviors adhered to Hn.1, with subjects contributing their full endowments or zero depending on whether α is smaller or larger than 0.25. Given that we have α < 0.25 in 12.5% of periods and α > 0.25 in 87.5% of periods, C i /E i would have been 87.5% on average had all subjects behaved as predicted by Hn.1.
A closer look finds the data to be inconsistent with Hn.1 in important ways, however. The last three rows of Table 2 report average C i /E i separated not by endowment but rather by the range in which the group's median incentive parameter α lies. We report average C i /E i during periods in which α < 0.25 (VCM incentives), average C i /E i when 0.3 ≤ α ≤ 0.6 (in theory high enough to induce full contributions but possibly inducing lower contributions either due to behaviorally continuous responses to incentives or to high contributors' resistance to "unfair"
sharing, or both), and lastly average C i /E i during periods in which 0.7 ≤ α ≤ 1 (a range of stronger incentives, from a behavioral perspective). For each treatment, the average proportion contributed is substantially above 0 even if α < 0.25, and it rises as the range of α does, demonstrating that contributions respond more smoothly to incentive changes, rather than showing a discontinuous jump at α = 0.25. 
Regression analysis and further results
For a more nuanced view of the determinants of voting and of how contributions are affected by the distribution parameter in different treatments and for subjects with different endowments, it is helpful to simultaneously control for several variables using multivariate regressions.
11 Differences in average contributions across the ranges shown are highly significant. For example, in Wilcoxon matched pair tests where each member of a pair is the average contribution of a group's members during all periods in which 0.3 ≤ α ≤ 0.6 and the other is the average contribution of the same group's members during all periods in which 0.7 ≤ α ≤ 1 and only groups operating in each phase for at least two periods are included, the difference in contributions is significant with p < 0.001 when considering data of all treatments or data of voting (exogenous) treatments only or data of quiz (random) treatments only. When studying voting and contribution decisions a potential endogeneity bias arises in regressions that study the two types of decisions separately. However, applying a 2SLS/IV strategy is also problematic because the value of α that affects decisions in the contribution stage is determined in the voting stage by a subset of subjects only, namely those voting for the median value. In the following, we therefore discuss separate estimates, first considering the determinants of the contribution choice (in section 4.2.1) and then the determinants of the voting decision (section 4.2.2). We check for potential problems that arise from endogeneity issues by estimating 2SLS models for the relevant sample, but reserve results for an appendix. It is comforting to note that the estimated 2SLS models cannot reject the exogeneity of α as a determinant of contributions at anything approaching conventional levels (see Appendix B). Table 3 presents a series of regressions attempting to explain the proportion of endowment that subjects contribute. All specifications include subject random effects, as well as standard errors clustered at the group level in order to account for interdependencies across subjects in a group.
Contribution decisions
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In (1), the contribution decision is expressed as a function of the current value of α, its square, dummy variables denoting low and middle endowment subjects (with the high endowment subjects as reference group), a dummy variable for quiz-determined endowments (Quiz), a dummy for voted (as opposed to exogenous) α (Vote), a period trend term, lagged C i /E i , and interactions of the low and middle endowment dummies with α, Quiz, and Vote, to allow for the possibility that their effects differ by endowment. The estimates for this specification (as well as for all other Table 3 specifications) show C i /E i to be significantly increasing in α, indicating that contributions respond rather in a continuous fashion to α, instead of jumping from zero to full endowment at α = 0.25.
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The coefficient on α 2 is negative, suggesting concavity, but not 12 We have chosen random over fixed effects based on Hausman tests, which clearly fail to reject the null hypothesis that the random effects estimator is consistent and efficient. This means that the effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, and random effects should be preferred. For robustness, we have confirmed in additional regressions that including fixed effects does not affect any of our main results. 13 To show this more formally, we estimated Table 3 's regressions using an α ≥ 0.3-dummy variable in place of or in addition to the variables α and α 2 , finding that the fit is superior (judged, for example, by the R-squared and the Akaike information criterion) when using either α and α 2 or α alone than when using the cut-off dummy. Our finding of continuity of responsiveness to marginal incentives resembles those of Prisbrey (1996, 1997) and  significant. C i /E i does not appear to vary significantly for the two distinguished endowments or their interaction with α. The coefficient on the Quiz-dummy is negative and mildly significant in two of the specifications in Table 3 , indicating that contributions are smaller when endowments are determined by performance, an effect that seems not to differ by endowment (see the interaction terms). Determination of α by vote affects C i /E i positively for high endowment subjects, but the effect is marginally significant in one specification only. . There is also a weak but statistically significant upward time trend in contributions.
Insert Table 3 around here
In our theoretical discussion, we hypothesized that behavior might differ depending on subjects' degrees of inequality aversion, an individual preference parameter. To explore this issue, we investigate the impact of two individual characteristics-gender, and Cooperativeness (Coop), a measure constructed from the Ring-test decisions (see Appendix D for details).
Columns (2) to (4) in Table 3 add to the basic specification a Female dummy and/or the variable
Coop, along with their interactions with the prevailing α. In the regression of column (2) we find that Female obtains a positive coefficient and the interaction term a negative one, although neither is significant in this specification. In column (3) we see that the Ring-test measure of cooperativeness correctly identifies a propensity to contribute more to a public good, along with a relative insensitivity to the strength of the individual incentive (see the negative and significant interaction term). Finally, when both variables and their interactions with α are included in column (4), we see that the effects shown in columns (2) and (3) continue to hold but are strengthened in both magnitude and significance. In particular, there is a significant negative coefficient on the interaction term between Female and α: It appears to be the case that female subjects are less responsive to increases in this incentive measure. 14 . Thus, Female and Coop Brandts and Schram (2001) (see above, note 7). We can also demonstrate that positive responsiveness to α persists within the range where α ≥ 0.3 by estimating regressions (not shown) using the observations in that range, only.
14 Note that the negative coefficient on the interaction term is still considerably smaller than the positive coefficient on α itself. Hence female subjects are somewhat responsive to incentives, just less so than males are.
appear to capture individual preference-related characteristics that are predictive of higher contributions and lower responsiveness to monetary incentives but that are rather distinct. 
Voting choices
When analyzing voting on α in the QV and RV treatments, we consider two factors influencing own earnings and one that might influence the vote by way of social or otherregarding concerns. Assume subject i votes so as to maximize
where y i is i's earnings for the period, as given in (1'), and S i reflects i's social or other-regarding preference for equality and equity and is permitted to vary depending on i's endowment E i and on whether endowment was earned (Q = 1) or randomly assigned (Q = 0). S i is an individualspecific function which might be predictable on the basis of i's gender and background characteristics or i's behavior in other contexts. For simplicity, we rewrite (2) as an additive function of i's income and i's social preferences.
We focus first on the effects of α on i's income. Mathematically, the effect of α on y i decomposes into two terms, making
The first argument of g is the marginal effect of α on y i taking the contributions of each subject as given, and the second is the marginal effect of α on y i acting through its effect on the other group members' contributions. 16 The impact of changing α on i's income through a change in i's own contribution is ignored by virtue of the usual envelope argument.
changing α on group-mates' contributions up to the time of a given vote.
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Assuming a first-order condition that can be linearized in the arguments of (2"), we adopt as the core of our estimating equation:
where it v  is the value of α for which subject i votes in period t. On the right hand side (RHS), the term multiplying coefficient b 0 is the expression for
To implement the second RHS term, we need an assumption about how subject i forms an expectation of ∂C -i /∂α in period t. We assume that i calculates a weighted average of past observed changes in others' contributions in her group, placing greater weight on more recent changes because she assumes that others' reactions may be evolving with experience, because she remembers more clearly more recent changes, or for some combination of the two reasons. Specifically, we set
where Δ max is the maximum possible value of ΔC -i /Δα, d ≥ 0 is the backward discounting rate for past observations, and the term in curled brackets is thus the weighted average proportion of the maximum possible change in contributions that i has observed. the discussion of our estimates, we refer to the purely distributive term multiplied by b 0 as the "distributive effect" and to the term measuring α's effect on i's income through changes in others' contributions-which has coefficient b 1 -as the "incentive effect." In our regressions, we allow for differences in the incentive effect at different endowment levels by including interactions with low and high endowment dummy variables, but we omit such interactions for the distributive effect because its structure already incorporates contribution terms and is thus in practice highly correlated with endowment.
With respect to the social preference portion of (2'')-) , E ( i Q i  S -we control for the possibility that subjects view redistribution as less fair when endowments are earned via quiz performance by including a dummy variable for our QV treatment, Quiz, as well as two endowment dummy interactions. We also investigate possible social preferences by including in some specifications Female and Coop dummy variables. We include free-standing dummy variables for two endowment levels to check whether endowment levels have effects not captured by the other terms. A time trend is also included, as are subject random effects (like in the case of contribution decisions, a Hausman test confirms that the random effects estimator is consistent and efficient). Finally, ε it is an error term. Our predictions correspond to b 0 > 0, b 1 > 0 and b 2 > 0. Table 4 displays the results of the regression estimates using best-fitting d = 1.4 as determined in the simplest specification, that of column (1). That column's result supports our predictions with significant positive coefficients on the distributive and incentive effects, although the latter is not distinguishable from zero for low and middle endowment subjects, considering the interaction terms. The Quiz (or 'earned endowment') treatment effect is insignificant for all subjects in this specification. Low endowment as such has a large and significant negative effect on the vote for α, while the coefficient on middle endowment is small and quite insignificant after controlling for the other effects, indicating no difference with high endowment subjects except via interactions with the incentive and treatment effects.
Insert Table 4 around here
The results in column (2), which adds Female and Coop dummies, are qualitatively similar for the other variables with two notable differences: First, the incentive effect is now positive and weakly significant for middle -in addition to high -endowment subjects, providing an additional success for our prediction regarding b 1 . Second, there is a weakly significant positive (negative) effect of Quiz for low (middle) endowment subjects. Hence, our prediction regarding b 2 is supported for the former only. ,. We do not find support for the idea that individual preferences matter to voting. In particular, there is no systematic difference in the voting behavior of female and cooperative subjects.
In sum, our regressions based on equation (3) suggest that subjects' votes on the distribution parameter were significantly influenced by its direct effect on their own earnings (distributive effect), while its predicted effect via its influence on others' contributions (incentive effect) is significant for high, but not for low and only weakly for middle endowment subjects.
Even after controlling for the distributive effect, low endowment subjects favor more redistribution, but their zeal in this regard is reduced when endowments were earned by quiz performance, another indication of respect for earned inequalities.
Discussion and conclusion
We introduce a new experimental design to study the struggle between equality, equity and the need for incentives, one of the most important sets of trade-offs in economic life. Our framework can be applied to the general question regarding the trade-off between equality and incentives that every society has to answer through decisions on taxes and redistribution, but it can, for instance, also be applied to the question of optimal incentives for work teams. Our new design nests the voluntary contribution mechanism in a more variable incentive model and makes incentive settings endogenous. By adding only slightly more complexity to one of the most familiar games in the literature of experimental economics, we get a richer framework that is able to answer a broader class of questions than the standard public goods game.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. While subjects' votes are largely predictable by self-interest, with the high and middle endowment subjects mostly favoring payment proportionate to contributions and the low endowment ones mostly favoring more equal payment, there are significant signs of preferences for both equality and equity. In particular, subjects display greater preference for equality when inequalities are arbitrary than when they are earned by task performance, as documented by differences in voting behavior between the treatments with earned and those with random endowments. This treatment difference with respect to the source of endowment heterogeneity is clear evidence that subjects distinguish between the concepts of equality and equity. A pure taste for equality is suggested by the fact that subjects who scored as more cooperative based on a Ring-test contribute more unconditionally, but are less responsive to incentives; the same is also true of female subjects. On average, subjects in our experiment select an incentive setting that reduces inequality by 22% relative to the inequality of their endowments and of a distribution in proportion to inputs. We find some, albeit weak, evidence that voting makes subjects more cooperative, suggesting that democratic participation is good for overall welfare.
With respect to the hypotheses laid out in our theoretical predictions section, our results, while partly consistent with conventional predictions Hn.1 and Hn.2, were generally more consistent with behavioral predictions Hb.1 and Hs.1. Our results provide some lessons to be drawn for the design of actual institutions. One is that continuous rather than dichotomous response to the incentive parameter suggests that organizations considering an element of rewardsharing, for instance to foster helping behaviors among workers, can anticipate smaller responses to changes in marginal rewards than standard theory predicts. Another implication, most relevant to cooperatives and other intentionally solidaristic organizations, is that the desires of some team members to reduce inequalities as an end in itself means that maximization of joint utility and of joint money payoffs may call for different choices along the spectrum of incentives versus equality.
Even though our design makes the presence of fairness preferences and incentive considerations more transparent by making the immediate interest of the likely median voters a neutral one, an interesting extension would be to mimic the right-skewedness of real world income distributions by starting with an asymmetric distribution of endowments-5, 8, 15, say, rather than the 5, 10, 15 of the current design-in which case we should expect to see somewhat more redistribution prevail. One suggestion that might be drawn from the deleterious effect of such redistribution on incentives is that a more equal initial distribution of skills and other assets, which can be fostered by education and tax policies, among others, could provide a foundation for a more prosperous society. OLS regressions with subject random effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by group. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. OLS regressions with subject random effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by group. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Appendix (not intended for publication)
"Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment"
Appendix A: Additional results 
Appendix B: 2SLS/Instrumental variable estimations
We estimate two-stage least squares models where the value of α in the equation for contributions is predicted by a first-stage regression in which the incentive and distributive effect variables serve as instruments. The main difficulty here is that about half of contribution decisions were made by subjects who had not voted for the value of α that determines their incentive, so including first-stage regressions resembling those in Table 5 is inappropriate for such subjects. A feasible albeit imperfect solution is to estimate 2SLS regressions using only observations of individuals who had voted for the median α in the period in question.
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This turns out to be 57% of all observations, owing to the substantial number of cases in which two or even three group members selected the same α. Even so, with observations from the RE and QE treatments (in which α is exogenous) also excluded, our 2SLS estimates are based on far fewer observations than are those of Table 3 (461 versus 2016, or less than 23%). Any comparison between the contribution regressions discussed in the text and our 2nd stage IV estimates must accordingly be done with caution.
We show three sets of 2SLS regressions that vary with respect to the inclusion or not in the 1st stage regression of two sets of interaction terms, those between endowment dummy variables and the incentive effect, and those between the same dummies and Quiz. In the new 1st stage regressions, corresponding roughly to the ones shown in Table 4 , the positive and highly significant coefficient on the distributive effect is confirmed, and the effect of Quiz is positive and significant, with specification (3) suggesting that this is especially attributable to the reactions of low endowment subjects. The coefficients on the incentive effect are insignificant except in the no interaction specification, and there is a marginally significant coefficient for the interaction with the low endowment dummy in specification (3). In both cases, the incentive variable has the "wrong" sign. The result seems unsurprising in view of the facts that the predicted incentive effect also generally failed to hold for middle endowment subjects in Table 4 and that it is middle subjects who account for the bulk of the median voter observations used in this exercise. The Female and Coop dummies are omitted since neither is significant when included. Because these results are equivalent to OLS estimates for the subsample who vote for 20 Another conceivable approach would be to include both the α that a given subject voted for, treated as endogenous, and the median α that prevails for the group, treated as exogenous, in the 2nd-stage regressions. But this is infeasible because of the very high correlation between self-voted and median α, which is even identical for many observations. median α in a given period, differences with Table 4 must be attributed to sample selection (including the aforementioned oversampling of middle subjects), not the 2SLS setting.
It is in the 2nd stage regressions for contributions that differences attributable to the endogeneity of α could potentially appear. Table A .3 shows three versions of the regression which differ only with respect to the 1st stage variants used to predict α, these being the three regressions of Table A .2, with the same order maintained. Because the square of the predicted α, the endowment dummies, and all interaction terms involving those dummies turn out to be insignificant, they are dropped from these specifications. The Hansen J-statistics reported at the bottom of the table indicate that the instruments included in the 1st stage regressions pass the over-identification tests comfortably.
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However, the Wu-Hausman tests of weak instruments return F-statistics having p-values of about 0.7, far too high to reject the hypothesis that α is after all exogenous. The predicted α variable obtains highly significant positive coefficients, further allaying any concern that the effect of this parameter on contributions found in previous regressions was due to endogeneity bias. Interestingly, the coefficients on Quiz, which are negative in Table 3 , are positive and significant at the 10% level in its 2SLS counterparts.
However, when we estimate an OLS version of the same contributions regression shown in Table   A .3 for the same subset of observations, it turns out that Quiz has a significant positive coefficient in it as well, so that the difference is again attributable to the difference in sample, not to failure to account for the endogeneity of α. Coefficient robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Appendix C: Instructions for treatment QV
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Welcome to an experiment on decision-making. Thank you for participating! During the experiment you will be asked to make decisions and so will the other participants. Your decisions, as well as the decisions of the other participants, will determine your monetary payoff according to the rules that will be explained shortly.
As is standard in such experiments, communication of any kind with other participants is prohibited. If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to assist you.
The experiment is computerized and will last for approximately two hours. Decisions will be made on your screen. All your decisions and answers to questions remain confidential and anonymous. We will use the identification tag that you have received on entering the room only to identify you when we pay you your income after the experiment.
The experiment will consist of two parts. You will receive instructions on the relevant parts in turn. We will read the instructions aloud and, then, give time for you to ask questions. Please do not hesitate to ask if anything is unclear. Decisions in the two parts of the experiment are completely independent.
Your income in the experiment will be in "tokens." At the end of the experiment, tokens will be converted into euro at an exchange rate which is specified in the respective part.
Part I
In Part I, all persons in the room will be randomly matched into pairs of two. Nobody will find out neither during nor after the experiment with whom he or she was connected. You will have to make 24 choices between two options, called Option A and Option B. Every option allocates a positive or negative number of tokens to your account and a positive or negative amount of tokens to the other person's account. This other person answers exactly the same questions. Your total income from Part I depends on your decision and the decision of the other person in your pair.
Example:
Option A Option B Your payoff 10.00 7.00 Other's payoff -5.00 4.00
If you choose option A, you will receive 10 tokens and the other person will be deducted 5 tokens. If the other person in your pair chooses option A too, then you will also receive a 22 The instructions for the other treatments are analogous.
deduction of 5 tokens. In total you would have earned 5 tokens (10 tokens from your choice minus 5 tokens from the choice of the other person).
In case you choose option B and the other person chooses option A, you will receive 2 tokens (7 tokens from your own choice minus 5 tokens from the choice of the other person in your pair). The other person would have earned 14 tokens (10 tokens + 4 tokens).
Your total income from Part I will be determined as follows: Looking at your decisions, the values for "Your payoff" will be summed up. Looking at the person you are connected with, the values for "Other's payoff" will be summed up. The sum of both sums determines your payoff and will be exchanged into euros according to the following exchange rate: 3 tokens = 1 euro. This exchange rate is only valid for Part I.
You do not get any information on single decision of the person you are paired with, but you will be informed about the sum of payoffs.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. We will come to your seat to answer them.
Part II
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The tokens you earn in Part II will be exchanged into euros at the end of the experiment according to the following exchange rate: 10 tokens = 1 euro.
All participants will be divided in groups of three members. You will not learn the identity of the other participants in your group.
At the beginning of Part II
At the outset you will be asked to answer 20 trivia questions. For each question, we will provide four answers, but only one of them is correct. The endowment that you will receive in each of the subsequent periods in Part II depends on the number of questions you answer correctly. Specifically, the group member within your group with the most correct answers will receive the highest endowment; the group member within your group with the second-most correct answers will receive the second-highest endowment and so on. Equal numbers of correct answers will be resolved by a random draw of the computer. Thus, there is always a strict ranking of endowments within your three-person group.
The distribution of endowments within your group will be: The rank will also be your group member number. 23 Handed out after completion of Part I.
The basic decision situation
You will learn later exactly how the experiment is conducted. We first introduce you to the basic decision situation. You will find control questions at the end of the description of the decision situation that help you to get a better understanding. As you know you will be a member of a group consisting of 3 people. In each period each group member has to decide on the allocation of his or her endowment. You can either invest your endowment into your private account or you can contribute them fully or partially to a project. Each token you do not contribute to the project will automatically remain in your private account.
Your income from the private account each period You will earn one token for each token you put into your private account. For example, if you put 15 tokens into your private account, your income in this period will amount to exactly 15 tokens out of your private account. If you put 2 tokens into your private account, your income from this account will be 2 tokens for that period. No one except you earns something from your private account.
Your income from the project each period
Your income from the project depends on three things: (1) your contribution to the project, (2) the combined contribution to the project by all group members, and (3) a proportion x, between 0 and 1, which determines the weight placed on (1) versus (2).
If x = 1, only your own contribution to the project affects your project income; in particular, your project income is then 2·c i , where c i is your contribution.
If x = 0, only the combined contribution affects your project income; in particular, your project income is then (2·C)/3, where C is the total contribution to the project by all members of your group, yourself included.
If x is more than 0 but less than one, some weight is placed both on c i (or more specifically, on 2·c i ) and on C (that is, on (2/3)·C).
Generalizing, what you earn is + .
Your total income each period
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the project:
Income from your private account (= endowment -contribution to the project) + Income from the project = Sum of income each period Or, mathematically:
where e i denotes your endowment.
Remember: x is the weight placed on your contribution, (1-x) is the weight placed on the total contributions within your group.
Control questions
Please answer the following control questions. They will help you to gain an understanding of the calculation of your income, which varies with your decision about how you distribute your tokens. Please answer all the questions and write down your calculations. After that, please enter your answers on the screen. For the first set of questions, assume that x = 1 and that you are the second-ranked member of your group, i.e., your endowment is 10 tokens.
1. Assume that none of the three group members (including you) contributes anything to the project. What will your total income in tokens be? Your income ___________ What will group Member 1's total income in tokens be? ___________ What will group Member 3's total income in tokens be? ___________ 2. You contribute 10 tokens to the project. The other members of the group contribute 13, respectively 4 tokens to the project. What will your total income be? Your income ___________ What will group Member 1's total income in tokens be? ___________ What will group Member 3's total income in tokens be? ___________ 3. The other two members contribute a total of 5 tokens to the project. a) What will your total income be, if you -in addition to the 10 tokens -contribute 0 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ b) What will your total income be, if you -in addition to the 10 tokens -contribute 5 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ c) What will your total income be, if you -in addition to the 10 tokens -contribute 10 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ 4. Assume that you contribute 5 tokens to the project. a) What is your total income if the other group members -in addition to your 5 tokenscontribute another 3 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ b) What is your total income if the other group members -in addition to your 5 tokenscontribute another 10 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ c) What is your income if the other group members -in addition to your 5 tokenscontribute another 20 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ For the second set of questions, assume that x = 0 and that you are again the second-ranked member of your group, i.e., your endowment is 10 tokens.
5. Assume that none of the three group members (including you) contributes anything to the project.
What will your total income in tokens be? Your income ___________ What will group Member 1's total income in tokens be? ___________ What will group Member 3's total income in tokens be? ___________ 6. You contribute 10 tokens to the project. The other members of the group contribute 13, respectively 4 tokens to the project. What will your total income be? Your income ___________ What will group Member 1's total income in tokens be? ___________ What will group Member 3's total income in tokens be? ___________ 7. The other two members contribute a total of 10 tokens to the project. a) What will your total income be, if you -in addition to the 10 tokens -contribute 2 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ b) What will your total income be, if you -in addition to the 10 tokens -contribute 5 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ c) What will your total income be, if you -in addition to the 10 tokens -contribute 8 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ 8. Assume that you contribute 5 tokens to the project. a) What is your total income if the other group members -in addition to your 5 tokenscontribute another 4 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ b) What is your total income if the other group members -in addition to your 5 tokenscontribute another 10 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ c) What is your income if the other group members -in addition to your 5 tokenscontribute another 19 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ For the third set of questions, assume that x = 0.5 and that you are again the second-ranked member of your group, i.e., your endowment is 10 tokens.
9. Assume that none of the three group members (including you) contributes anything to the project. What will your total income in tokens be? Your income ___________ What will group Member 1's total income in tokens be? ___________ What will group Member 3's total income in tokens be? ___________ 10. You contribute 10 tokens to the project. The other members of the group contribute 13, respectively 4 tokens to the project. What will your total income be? Your income ___________ What will group Member 1's total income in tokens be? ___________ What will group Member 3's total income in tokens be? ___________ 11. The other two members contribute a total of 10 tokens to the project. a) What will your total income be, if you -in addition to the 10 tokens -contribute 2 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ b) What will your total income be, if you -in addition to the 10 tokens -contribute 5 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ c) What will your total income be, if you -in addition to the 10 tokens -contribute 8 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ 12. Assume that you contribute 5 tokens to the project. a) What is your total income if the other group members -in addition to your 5 tokenscontribute another 4 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ b) What is your total income if the other group members -in addition to your 5 tokenscontribute another 10 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ c) What is your income if the other group members -in addition to your 5 tokenscontribute another 19 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________
The Procedure
Each period in Part II consists of two phases, and there are a total of 15 such periods in Part II. After the trivia questions, you will learn your rank within your group (equal to your group member number) and your endowment. You will receive this endowment at the beginning of each period, and your rank will not change from period to period.
Phase 1 -choice of x:
Your group can choose the preferred x. You can choose from the following values of x: 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1. Each group member will be asked to propose his or her preferred x. The median of these three proposals within your group will then be implemented and be valid for this period. Suppose the three proposals within your group are: 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3. The median proposal to be implemented would be 0.2. Suppose the three proposals within your group are: 0.9, 1 and 1. The median proposal to be implemented would be 1. Suppose the three proposals within your group are: 0.5, 0.6 and 0.6. The median proposal to be implemented would be 0.6. At the end of Phase 1 you will be informed about the relevant median proposal.
Phase 2 -contribution decision:
Each member of the group has to decide on how much of his or her endowment to contribute to the project. The rest of the individual endowment will be automatically invested into the private account.
Your income for this period will be determined in the following way:
Reminder Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the project: Income from your private account (= endowment -contribution to the project) + Income from the project = Sum of income each period Or, mathematically:
At the end of each period, you will be informed about all individual contributions within your group (you will be able to link them to the Member numbers) and your period income in tokens as well as the individual period income in tokens of the other two members.
Each of the 15 periods will be identical and will follow the protocol described above. You will be staying in the same group for the 15 periods, i.e., the two other group members will remain unchanged over Part II of the experiment.
The End
Your total income over the 15 periods will be converted to euro (at the exchange rate 10 tokens = 1 €) and privately be paid to you at the end of the experiment. It will be added to the amount that you earned from Part I of the experiment.
After Part II, we ask you to fill in a questionnaire. Please answer the questions frankly and seriously because they are very important for our research. Thereafter, the experiment ends. There will be no other parts or repetitions.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. We will come to your place to answer them privately.
Appendix D: Ring-test
The social orientation questionnaire consists of 24 choices (see Table A .4) between two own-other payoff allocations (the "decomposed game") in constant, anonymous pairs. Each allocation assigns a given amount of experimental money to the subject herself, called own payoff x, and a certain amount of points to the matched player, called other payoff y. It was common knowledge that every subject received the same questionnaire. During the questionnaire players did not receive any feedback about the other player's choices in order to avoid strategic considerations. The payoff allocations were constructed such that
Hence, each allocation can be represented as a vector in a Cartesian plane which lies on a circle with radius r centred at the origin.
The payoff allocations are paired such that each choice consists of two adjacent vectors. If one assumes that a -yet unknown -motivational vector M  exists, a subject will choose that allocation (vector) which is closer to M  . Based on a series of choices, therefore, it is possible to determine a subject's "social motivation" with respect to weighing own payoffs (x) versus others payoffs (y) by adding up x and y separately across all choices and calculating the angle  M of the resulting vector M  . By means of this angle subjects' motivation can be classified as belonging to one of the following eight categories: individualism, altruism, cooperation, competition, martyrdom, masochism, sadomasochism, and aggression.
In addition, the length of the motivational vector serves as a measure of consistency, i.e., whether the choices are taken such that the subject has always chosen that vector which is closest to the motivational vector. If a subject chooses consistently throughout the 24 choices, the length of the resulting vector would be 30. Random choice would result in a vector of zero length.
In order to incentivize the procedure, subjects' total payoffs from the series of choices were determined by the sum of choices made by the subject herself and by the choices of the paired player. The classification of the subjects was accomplished by means of the angle of the motivational vector M  (based on the vectors defining the basic social motivation; see Figure C1 ) 
